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Abstract: 
We estimate a structural model of the market for automatic teller machines (ATMs) in order to 
evaluate  the  implications  of  regulating  ATM  surcharges  on  ATM  entry  and  consumer  and 
producer surplus. We estimate the model using data on firm and consumer locations, and identify 
the parameters of the model by exploiting a source of local quasi–experimental variation, that the 
state of Iowa banned ATM surcharges during our sample period while the state of Minnesota did 
not.  We  develop  new  econometric  methods  that  allow  us  to  estimate  the  parameters  of 
equilibrium  models  without  computing  equilibria.  Monte  Carlo  evidence  shows  that  the 
estimator performs well. We find that a ban on ATM surcharges reduces ATM entry by about 12 
percent, increases consumer welfare by about 10 percent and lowers producer profits by about 10 
percent.  Total  welfare  remains  about  the  same  under  regimes  that  permit  or  prohibit  ATM 
surcharges and is about 17 percent lower than the surplus maximizing level. This paper can help 
shed light on the theoretically ambiguous implications of free entry on consumer and producer 
welfare for differentiated products industries in general and ATMs in particular. 
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views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not represent those of the Federal Reserve Banks 
of New York or San Francisco or the Federal Reserve System.   2 
1. Introduction 
 
   The goal of this paper is to estimate a structural model of the market for automatic teller 
machines (ATMs) in order to understand the implications of regulating ATM surcharges on 
ATM  entry  and  consumer  welfare.  We  develop  new  econometric  methods  that  allow  us  to 
feasibly  estimate  the  parameters  of  a  structural  equilibrium  model  using  entry  data  without 
computing equilibria. This paper can help shed light on the theoretically ambiguous implications 
of free entry for consumer and producer welfare for differentiated products industries in general 
and ATMs in particular.  
  Since  the  establishment  of  the  first  ATM  networks  in  the  early  1970s,  ATMs  have 
become a ubiquitous and growing component of consumer banking technology. By 2001, there 
were over 324,000 ATMs in the United States, processing an average of 117 transactions per 
day, suggesting that each person in the United States uses an ATM an average of 45 times per 
year.
1 
  In spite of the vast and growing presence of ATMs, product differentiation may imply 
that the market for ATMs does not reflect perfect competition or yield optimal outcomes. In 
particular, the surcharge—the price charged by an ATM on top of the set interchange fee—has 
increased significantly over the last several years. The increase can be linked to an April 1996 
decision by the major ATM networks to allow surcharges among their member ATMs.
2 Between 
1996 and 2001, the number of ATMs tripled, but the number of transactions per ATM fell by 
about 45 percent. The technology of ATMs is characterized by high fixed costs—primarily the 
                                                 
1 ATM & Debit News (2001). 
2 The decision was made in apparent reaction to the threat of costly antitrust litigation.   3 
cost  of  leasing  the  machine,  keeping  it  stocked  with  cash,  and  servicing  it—and  very  low 
marginal  costs.  Thus,  the  increased  price  of  ATM  services  has  been  accompanied  by  an 
increased average cost per ATM transaction. 
The increase in price suggests that there may have been “excess” entry of ATMs, in the 
sense that total welfare would have been higher with less entry. It also suggests that a policy by 
an  ATM  network  or  government  that  regulated  or  eliminated  surcharges  could  potentially 
increase total welfare. This would likely be true if new ATMs stole significant business from 
existing  ATMs  without  sufficiently  adding  to  consumer  welfare.  However,  ATMs  are 
differentiated products, with a primary characteristic being their location. The increase in the 
number  of  ATMs  implies  that  consumers  have to  travel  less  distance  to  use  an  ATM. This 
decrease  in  distance  can  compensate  for  the  increase  in  price.  Therefore,  it  is  theoretically 
ambiguous whether price restrictions would increase or decrease welfare. The answer depends 
on the relative weight of price and distance in the consumer utility function, firm cost structures, 
and the nature of the equilibrium interactions between the agents in the economy. 
We address these questions by specifying a static discrete choice differentiated products 
model of the ATM market. Consumer utility for an ATM is a function of distance and price. 
Firms  face  a  fixed  cost  per  ATM  that  can  vary  by  location,  but  no  marginal  costs.  Entry 
decisions and prices are determined in a simultaneous–moves Nash equilibrium. We create a data 
set that provides detailed locations for actual and potential ATMs and consumers for the border 
counties of Iowa and Minnesota. We use the data set together with new econometric techniques 
to estimate the structural parameters of the model. We then use our estimated parameters to 
assess the equilibrium implications of a surcharge ban and other policies.    4 
In general, it might be difficult to identify separately the two effects of distance and price 
elasticities using only entry data. However, we are able to identify and estimate these parameters 
by using the fact that the state of Iowa banned ATM surcharges during our sample period.
3 The 
fixed prices in Iowa will identify the distance disutility and firm cost parameters. The fact that 
Iowa did not allow surcharges but its neighboring states allowed them creates a source of local 
quasi–experimental variation, whereby the different pattern of ATM penetration rates between 
places in Iowa near its borders and places just outside the borders of Iowa will identify the price 
elasticity of demand.
4 
  This study builds on an entry literature started by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry 
(1992).  Like  more  recent  papers  in  this  literature  (Chernew,  Gowrisankaran,  and  Fendrick 
(2002), Mazzeo (2002), and Seim (2002)), we incorporate detailed geographic and product data 
that allows us to obtain more realistic results. Two other literatures also bear on this work. First 
is a literature has estimated spatial models in order to understand the prevalence of excess entry 
(see Davis (2002) and Berry and Waldfogel (1999)). 
  Second, a recent literature has sought to understand the implications of ATM surcharges 
(see Croft and Spencer (2003), Hannan, Kiser, McAndrews, and Prager (2004), Ishii (2005), 
Knittel and Stango (2004), and Massoud and Bernhardt (2002)). Ishii (2005) and Knittel and 
Stango (2004) also try to understand the extent to which consumers value additional ATMs. In 
both papers, the authors specify structural models of demand for banks with the main dependent 
variable being bank market shares. Our approach has both advantages and disadvantages relative 
to these papers. The disadvantage of our approach is that we do not explicitly model the linkage 
                                                 
3 The surcharge ban was overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 2002.   5 
between the provision of ATM services  and other banking services. However, our approach 
yields  advantages  in  terms  of  being  able  to  identify  the  relevant  parameters  and  predict 
equilibrium  outcomes.  In  particular,  our  identification  of  price  elasticity  comes  from  the 
difference  in  adoption  in  counties  on  either  side  of  the  Iowa  and  Minnesota  border;  the 
identification in Knittel and Stango (2004) comes from variation over time in adoption rates, 
while the identification in Ishii (2005) is from the cross-sectional variation in bank market shares 
within Massachusetts during one year. We explicitly model consumer and ATM locations, and 
use this to identify the disutility from travel distance; the other papers use counts of ATMs. Last, 
we explicitly model and estimate the structural parameters underlying a bank or ATM decision to 
open an ATM, which allows us to simulate the equilibrium impact of a change in the surcharge 
policy; the other papers focus only on consumer preferences.  
  Our model is methodologically most similar to Seim (2002). As in that paper, we assume 
that firms operating within a market have incomplete information, in that firms do not know their 
competitors’ cost shocks. We also specify the precise location of potential firm entry points 
within a localized area. A model of localized competition is crucial for understanding the welfare 
impact of ATM surcharges because of the consumers’ tradeoff between location and price. Our 
model and estimation strategy differs from and extends Seim’s methodology in three important 
ways. First, we model entry as an explicit function of fundamental utility and cost parameters 
and then use these parameters to evaluate well–defined policy experiments. In contrast, it is not 
possible to obtain fundamental utility parameters from Seim’s work. Second, as noted above, we 
identify  the  price  elasticity  using  the  source  of  quasi–experimental  variation  created  by  the 
                                                                                                                                                            
4 Other studies that have identified economic parameters using the quasi–experimental variation created by sharp 
borders between different policy regimes include Holmes (1998), Chay and Greenstone (2003) and Hahn, Todd, and 
van der Klaauw (2001).   6 
policy differences between Iowa and Minnesota. Third, as necessitated by the complexity of our 
model, we develop new econometric methods that allow us to estimate the parameters without 
solving for the equilibria of the game, thereby reducing the computational burden of estimating 
the model. Our method builds on methods developed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002), Guerre, 
Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), Hotz and Miller (1993) and Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2004) in 
other contexts. 
  The remainder of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 describes the model and 
inference. Section 3 details the data, including background on the industry and some reduced–
form  evidence.  Section  4  provides  the  results  of  the  estimation  and  the  policy  experiments, 
including Monte Carlo evidence on the performance of our estimator. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Model and Inference 
 
2.1 Model and equilibrium 
  We develop a simple game–theoretic model of firm and consumer behavior in the market 
for ATMs that we estimate using data on consumer locations and potential and actual ATM 
locations. The unit of observation is a county for some specifications and the entire border region 
of a state for other specifications. Our model is static. We feel that a static model is a reasonable 
approximation since sunk costs in the ATM industry are low; machines can be resold, and ATMs 
are generally installed within existing retail establishments.    7 
  There exists a set of potential ATM locations  j=1,…,J , each with an entrepreneur. Each 
entrepreneur simultaneously decides whether to install an ATM at her location.
5 In Minnesota, 
each entrepreneur also chooses her price (conditional on entry) at the same time as the entry 
decision. Our model of firms abstracts away from the strategic effect of firms with multiple 
ATMs, as most merchants do not have multiple retail establishments within the same immediate 
geographic area. 
  Consumers, denoted  i =1,…,I, observe the set of actual ATMs as well as the posted price 
for each ATM. In Iowa, these prices are fixed at zero, although the regulated price that the ATM 
receives from the transaction (which is called the interchange fee) is positive. Consumers then 
make a decision of which ATM to use, if any. 
There are several simplifications inherent in our specification that are necessitated by the 
lack of available consumer data. First, we do not model the fact that consumers may not know 
the prices or locations of all ATMs, and hence that there may be a search. In addition, we model 
ATM transactions as a separate good, rather than as part of a menu of banking services. Thus, we 
do not model the fact that the consumer’s bank may charge a fee in addition to the fee charged 
by the ATM, nor do we allow for banks to price discriminate by not surcharging their own 
banking  customers,  or  to  subsidize  ATM  transactions  as  a  way  of  obtaining  customers  and 
charging them for other services.
6 To check the robustness of this latter assumption, we report 
results where we restrict the sample to include only nonbank ATM locations (i.e., convenience 
                                                 
5 Note that this model is different from Seim (2002) in that her model assumes that each video store entrepreneur 
chooses one census tract from the set of tracts in the county. The difference in approaches stems from the fact that 
we believe that existing retail establishments are a reasonable universe for the set of potential ATM locations, while 
the set of potential video store locations is more open. 
6 See Massoud and Bernhardt (2002).   8 
stores),  as  ATM  use  at  these  sites  often  involves  paying  a  surcharge  regardless  of  bank 
membership. 
  We now detail the  specifics of the consumer and firm problems. Consumers make a 
discrete choice from among the ATMs in the region. To capture the fact consumers will be more 
likely to use an ATM if more ATMs enter the market, we specify an outside alternative whose 
utility we normalize, ui0 = 0.
7 The outside option corresponds to using a bank teller instead of an 
ATM, or to not obtaining cash.  
  The utility from using an ATM depends on the distance between the consumer and the 
ATM as well as on price. Specifically, we let this utility be: 
 
(1)  uij = !+"dij +#pj + $c%ij, 
 
where dij is the distance from consumer i’s location to ATM j’s location, pj is the price charged 
by ATM j, δ is the gross mean benefit from using the ATM, !ij is an idiosyncratic unobservable, 
and α and β are parameters that indicate the impact of distance and price on utility, respectively. 
As is generally true in discrete choice models, we cannot separately identify  !c. Hence, we 
exclude !c when estimating (1). The other parameters (δ, α, and β) should be interpreted as their 
true values divided by !c. 
                                                 
7 Without an outside good, consumers would be constrained to always choose some ATM machine. Additionally, 
the assumption of an outside good allows the model to generate reasonable substitution patterns in response to 
across-the-board ATM price changes, such as those that might occur as a result of a change in surcharge policy.   9 
  We assume that  !ij is distributed Type I extreme value, which gives rise to the standard 
multinomial logit expected quantity formula for consumer i at firm j conditional on entry by firm 
j: 
 
(2)  sij !,",#,n,p ( ) =
exp #+!dij +"pj ( )
1+ nk
k$j % exp #+!dik +"pk ( )+ exp #+!dij +"pj ( )
, 
 
where nk is a 0–1 indicator for whether potential entrant k has entered. 
  We  now  turn  to  the  model  of  potential  entrants.  Each  potential  entrant  must  decide 
whether to enter at her location, and will enter if her expected profits from entry are positive. We 
assume that the marginal cost of an ATM transaction is zero. We make this assumption because, 
except in very crowded locations where there is queuing and hence a shadow cost of usage of an 
ATM, the marginal cost of using an ATM is trivial, consisting roughly of the small amount of 
ink and paper used to print a receipt. Hence, the expected profits are given by the expected 
number of transactions times price minus the fixed cost of entry: 
 
(3)  E ! j " # $ % = E sij &,’,(,n,p ( ) " # $ %
i=1
I
) * pj + p
interchange ( )+ Fj. 
 
Given a market structure, the expected number of ATM transactions conditional on firm j’s entry 
can be derived by summing (2) over the set of consumers  i =1,…,I.   10 
  In contrast to marginal costs, the fixed costs of ATMs are high, about $1,300 per month,
8 
and might differ by location. We model fixed costs as: 
 
(4)  Fj = cj + !eej with cj = ! county j + " ! atbank j, 
 
where cj is observable to all potential ATMs in the region, and can be divided into a fixed effect 
that is specific to a small group of counties (! county j) and a shifter for whether the ATM is located 
at a bank ( ! " atbank j) as opposed to at another retail establishment such as a grocery store. 
  We let  ej be distributed logit (i.e., as the difference of two i.i.d. Type 1 extreme value 
random variables), with a standard deviation  !e. We assume that  ej is known to firm j at the 
time of her entry decision. However, we assume that firm j does not know the fixed cost shocks 
for the other potential entrants. The use of unobservable cost shocks of this type is common in 
the entry literature,
9 as it helps reduce the number of equilibria for entry models. 
  The  incomplete  information  about  the  cost  shocks  implies  that  it  is  meaningful  to 
consider a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium (BNE). In Iowa, a BNE specifies the entry decision for 
each type  ej for each firm,  j=1,…,J . It is easy to show that any BNE is characterized by a 
vector of cutoffs  e1,…,eJ , whereby firm j will enter if and only if ej ! ej. Let the 0-1 indicator 
inj  denote  whether  firm  j  enters  or  not,  and  let  Pr inj ej ( )  denote  the  entry  (or  no  entry) 
probability for firm j before ej is realized. The logit assumption implies that the density of  inj 
                                                 
8 See Dove Consulting (2004). 
9 See, for instance, Seim (2002) and Augereau, Greenstein and Rysman (2002).   11 
can  easily  be  expressed  in  terms  of  ej,  with  Pr inj =1 ej ( ) =
exp ej ( )
1+exp ej ( )   and 
Pr inj = 0 ej ( ) =1! Pr inj =1 ej ( ). Using these cutoffs, the vector of BNE cutoffs must satisfy: 
 
(5) 
 
0 = E ! j " # $ % = ! ! Pr in1 = n1 e1 ( )
nJ=0,1 &
nj+1=0,1 &
nj=1 &
nj’1=0,1 &
n1=0,1 &
(…( Pr inj’1 = nj’1 ej’1 ( )( Pr inj+1 = nj+1 ej+1 ( )(…( Pr inJ = nJ eJ ( )
( sij ),*,+,n,p
Iowa ( )(
i=1
I
& p
interchange ’ cj , ( )+ -eej ( ), j=1,…,J,
 
 
where p
interchange  is the regulated interchange fee. 
  The equilibrium conditions are slightly more complicated for Minnesota. For Minnesota, 
each firm is a Bertrand competitor, and hence must choose price together with an entry strategy. 
Call the vector of equilibrium prices p
eqm . Then, the BNE for Minnesota must satisfy two sets of 
conditions. First, it must satisfy conditions that are analogous to (5), except with the price vector 
p
eqm + p
interchange ( ) instead of p
interchange . Second, it must satisfy FOCs with respect to price: 
 
(6) 
 
0 =
!E " j # $ % &
!pj
=
!
!pj
! ! Pr in1 = n1 e1 ( )
nJ=0,1 ’
nj+1=0,1 ’
nj=1 ’
nj(1=0,1 ’
n1=0,1 ’ )…) Pr inj(1 = nj(1 ej(1 ( )
#
$
*
*
)Pr inj+1 = nj+1 ej+1 ( ))…) Pr inJ = nJ eJ ( )) sij +,,,-,n,p ( )) p
interchange + pj
eqm ( )
i=1
I
’
%
&
..
 
 
  Note that although firms are free to choose a different price for each realization of ej, ej 
only affects the fixed costs and hence does not enter into the FOC (6). Thus, in general, the BNE 
price will not depend on ej.   12 
 
2.2 Estimation 
  The predictions of the model specified in Section 2.1 depend on structural parameters that 
specify consumer utility and firm costs, which we group together as ! = ",#,$,%,&e ( ). Our goal 
is to obtain consistent estimates of the true parameters !0 , and use the estimates to evaluate the 
impact of ATM surcharges on welfare and ATM entry. 
  We could potentially obtain consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of !0  using 
the method of maximum likelihood. For a given θ, the likelihood is a function of endogenous 
data on entry and exogenous data on consumer locations, potential entrant firm locations, and the 
surcharge regime (e.g., Iowa or Minnesota). Let yj denote a 0–1 indicator for whether firm j has 
entered, and x denote the exogenous data for the region. If we assume that there is a unique 
vector of equilibrium cutoffs for any given θ  and x, then we can write the log likelihood for the 
region as: 
 
(7)  lnL yj,! ( ) = ln Pr inj = yj ej !,x ( ) ( ) ( )
j=1
J
" , 
 
where the equilibrium cutoffs are calculated using the appropriate FOCs (5) and/or (6) depending 
on the state and where we have now made explicit their dependence on x and θ. 
  In principle, we could estimate θ by maximizing the log likelihood function (7), as in 
Seim  (2002).  However,  maximizing  (7)  would  require  computing  the  equilibrium  entry 
probabilities for each parameter vector. Unlike Seim (2002), the equilibrium entry behavior in   13 
our model depends on an aggregation of individual consumer’s utility–maximizing decisions and 
on a pricing equilibrium, which makes this process computationally intractable for our model.  
  We develop an alternative method of inference that allows us to find consistent estimates 
of θ without explicitly solving for the BNE. Our method exploits the observation that a firm’s 
optimal decisions depend on the equilibrium actions of other firms only through the distribution 
of  other  firms’  actions.  If  all  the  information  that  a  firm  has  about  this  distribution  is  also 
observable  to  the  econometrician,  then  one  can  solve  for  the  optimal  behavior  of  firms, 
conditional on structural parameters, by substituting the distribution of the other firms’ actions 
from the data. This then allows us to create a pseudo-likelihood for any vector of structural 
parameters. 
  This same idea has been used to develop estimators for a variety of different models. 
Hotz and Miller (1993) develop methods to estimate the parameters of dynamic optimization 
problems without evaluating the dynamic decision problems, using the fact that decisions in the 
data reflect optimal behavior at the true parameters. In Hotz and Miller’s case, the analog of the 
econometrician observing all the known characteristics of a firm’s rivals is that there are no 
unobservable serially correlated state variables. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) develop 
methods  to  estimate  the  structural  parameters  of  first–price  private–value  auctions  without 
solving for the BNE of the auction game, based on the fact that an agent’s optimal bid depends 
on  others’  values  solely  through  their  bids,  and  that  these  bids  are  observable  to  the 
econometrician. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2005), and Pakes, 
Ostrovsky, and Berry (2004) show how to apply these methods to Markov–perfect equilibrium 
games.  The  common  feature  in  all  of  these  methods  is  that  they  rely  on  substituting  the 
distribution of actions of other individuals (or one’s future self in the case of Hotz and Miller   14 
(1993)) from the data into the decision-making process for an individual, and then evaluating the 
optimal decisions of a given individual. 
  For our model, one can see from (6) that the decisions of a firm depend on the vector of 
prices charged by other firms in the market. While firms can infer the equilibrium prices of their 
rivals from the exogenous data and structural parameters, we do not observe prices, and hence 
we cannot directly use this method. However, prices are only relevant for Minnesota, because 
prices in Iowa are fixed at zero by the  surcharge ban. Thus, we use this pseudo–likelihood 
method and the Iowa data to obtain consistent estimates of all the parameters except for price, 
and then estimate the price coefficient using Minnesota data. We now discuss the Iowa and 
Minnesota estimations in turn. 
  For our model in Iowa, (5) shows that firm j’s actions depend on competitors’ actions 
only  through  the  entry  probabilities  Pr ink ek !,x ( ) ( ),k " j.  As  the  data  are  assumed  to  be 
generated by the model evaluated at !0 , firm k’s entry probability conditional on the observable 
market characteristics in an infinitely large data set will reflect the equilibrium entry probability 
for this rival evaluated at !0 ; i.e., 
 
(8)   
 
Pr ! ink x ( ) = Pr ink =1 ek !0,x ( ) ( ), 
 
where  Pr ! ink x ( ) is the entry probability from a data set with an infinite number of regions for 
each given vector of characteristics x. Hence, for large data sets, the entry probabilities are 
essentially observable in the data, and the pseudo–likelihood method is appropriate.   15 
  We implement the method by substituting the data entry probabilities for k ! j from (8) 
into (5): 
 
(9) 
 
Pr
d inj =1!,x ( ) = Pr ! ! Pr " in1 = n1 x ( )
nJ=0,1 "
nj+1=0,1 "
nj=1 "
nj#1=0,1 "
n1=0,1 " $…$
%
&
’ Pr " inj#1 = nj#1 x ( )
$Pr " inj+1 = nj+1 x ( )$…$ Pr " inJ = nJ x ( )$ sij (,),*,n,p
Iowa ( )$
i=1
I
" p
interchange
# cj + ( )+ ,eej ( ) > 0).
 
 
We then substitute from (9) into (7), and define the pseudo–maximum likelihood estimator as the 
θ that maximizes this expression: 
 
(10)  ˆ !pseudo"ML = argmax
!
ln Pr
d inj = yj !,x ( ) ( )
j=1
J
# . 
 
 Note that if we take the  Pr ! ink x ( ) as fixed, then the only random variable in (9) is ej, which is 
distributed as a logit. Thus, conditional on obtaining the nonrandom part of (9) (which depends 
on the complicated sum of competitors’ actions) it is straightforward to evaluate the probability 
of entry in (9) and hence to maximize the pseudo–likelihood function (10). 
  To see that our pseudo–likelihood estimator will be consistent as the number of regions 
grows large, note that with many regions  Pr ! ink x ( ) will converge in probability to the true entry 
probability of firm k given the vector of area characteristics. If the entry probabilities for k ! j 
are correct, then (10) specifies the log likelihood of individual firms’ decisions given that the   16 
firms’ beliefs about their competitors are governed by  !0 . Thus,  ˆ !pseudo"ML  will approach the 
maximum  likelihood  estimator  of  this  individual  firm  problem.  Standard  asymptotic  theory 
implies that this individual firm maximum likelihood problem will provide consistent estimates 
of  θ,  and  hence  ˆ !pseudo"ML   will  also  be  consistent.  Section  4,  which  provides  Monte  Carlo 
evidence  on  the  performance  of  our  estimator relative  to  the  maximum  likelihood  estimator 
based on (7), shows that the pseudo–likelihood and maximum–likelihood estimators perform 
very similarly. 
  There are a few important details of this estimator that we have not yet discussed. First is 
the computation of the entry probabilities from the data,  Pr ! ink x ( ). We perform a reduced–form 
logit estimation of entry on all exogenous data x, and then use the predicted values as  Pr ! ink x ( ). 
In an infinitely large data set, we could nonparametrically estimate  Pr ! ink x ( ) by including a 
nonparametric expansion of x in the logit estimation. With finite data, the dimensionality of the 
characteristics space is too large. We include in this reduced–form logit estimation the number of 
consumers within each of six distance bands (.2, 1, 2, 5, 10, and 20 kilometers), the number of 
other potential entrants and potential at–bank (as opposed to at–grocer) entrants within these 
same distance bands and interactions of these variables. A central reason to report Monte Carlo 
experiments is to examine the extent to which this approximation to the true  Pr ! ink x ( ) biases 
our estimates. Note also that the reduced–form logit model also provides us with a confidence 
region for  Pr ! ink x ( ). It is straightforward to bootstrap from this confidence region in order to 
obtain standard errors for the structural parameters θ that account for this approximation.   17 
  Second, it is computationally difficult to solve for the nonrandom part of (9), because it 
involves a sum over  2
J!1 terms, and J, the number of potential ATM locations, has a mean of 
about  30  per  county  in  these  rural  counties.  Thus,  we  evaluate  this  sum  using  simulation. 
Specifically, we take uniform draws and convert them to a 0–1 realization of entry based on 
 Pr ! ink x ( ). We estimate our model with 20 simulation draws. As is standard in the literature, we 
use  the  same  draws  across  different  parameter  values.  We  experimented  with  using  more 
simulation  draws  but  found  almost  no  change  in  the  pseudo–likelihood.  The  Monte  Carlo 
experiments confirm that the simulations do not substantially change the estimates.  
  Third, we maximize the pseudo–likelihood function using the derivative–based Newton 
method. We did not experience any convergence problems, probably because the function is 
similar to a logit. We compute standard errors for the parameter estimates using the standard 
approximation  based  on  the  sum  of  the  outer–product  of  the  derivatives  of  the  individual 
contributions to the log likelihood. 
  Fourth,  in  some  specifications,  we  estimate  the  entire  border  region  in  Iowa  jointly, 
instead of county by county. We do this to avoid potentially misspecifying the market in cases 
where firms and consumers are near the border of two counties. For these specifications, we only 
consider the firms and consumers within 50 kilometers of the potential entrant, in order to reduce 
computational costs. This approximation is unlikely to affect the results substantially. 
  We  now  turn  to  the  estimation  of  the  price  coefficient  β.  We  make  the  identifying 
assumptions that fixed costs for border counties in Minnesota are similar to fixed costs for the 
corresponding Iowa border counties, and that consumers’ preferences are similar across the two 
regions. This implies that, after estimating the Iowa model, the only unknown parameter for the 
Minnesota data is β.   18 
  Although the fact that price is unobservable implies that we cannot directly substitute 
competitors’ prices in the same way that we substitute competitors’ entry decisions in Iowa, we 
can  still  directly  substitute  the  entry  probabilities  from  the  data  for  the  equilibrium  entry 
probabilities, as we do for Iowa. After doing this, (6) becomes 
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where  ˆ !,ˆ " ( ) are the estimated values of the parameters from the Iowa data. We solve for the 
vector p
eqm  by simultaneously solving the FOCs in (11). We then define the probability of entry 
analogously to (9) as: 
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where  ˆ !, ˆ "e ( ) are also estimated values of the parameters from the Iowa data. We then define the 
pseudo–likelihood estimator as the β that maximizes the analogous expression to (10) with the 
substitution of the correct entry probability from (12).   19 
  Our  substitution  of  the  reduced–form  entry  probabilities  simplifies  the  equilibrium 
computation, since we do not have to solve for the entry probabilities. As with the Iowa data, we 
evaluate (11) and (12) using simulation. Even with simulation methods and the substitution for 
the  exogenous  entry  probabilities,  evaluating  the  likelihood  for  Minnesota  is  very 
computationally intensive. However, our overall computation time is lessened because we only 
have to estimate one parameter with this method. 
  Importantly, the reduced–form relationship between the entry probability and exogenous 
variables will be different in Minnesota than in Iowa, because of the difference in the nature of 
competition.  However,  the  exogenous  observable  data  remain  the  same.  Hence,  we  estimate 
different reduced–form coefficients for Minnesota but use the same reduced–form model as for 
Iowa. 
  One  potential  issue  is  the  possibility  of  multiple  equilibria.  Multiple  equilibria  are 
particularly likely when the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic components of profits, !e, is 
small. For instance, with small  !e, if there are two entrants at a given location, then it may be 
profitable for exactly one entrant to enter, but not for both. This source of multiple equilibria is 
common in entry models.
10 Multiple equilibria are less likely in our model when there are sizable 
unobservable idiosyncratic components of profits. Moreover, one additional advantage of our 
estimation strategy is that it is robust to multiple equilibria if the equilibrium selection conditions 
on  observables.  As  an  example,  if  it  is  always the  case  that  the  equilibrium  entry  selection 
specifies that firms enter in order of most to least profitable based on observable variables, then a 
sufficiently  rich  reduced–form  model  will  capture  this  equilibrium  behavior.  However,  our 
                                                 
10 See, for instance, Berry (1992) and Andrews and Berry (2002).   20 
model is not robust to sunspot equilibria, since no predictor of probabilities based on observables 
can generate equilibrium selection based on unobservables. 
 
2.3 Identification  
  Our data is quite different from the data commonly used to identify consumer preferences 
for discrete choice utility specifications. For instance, we lack data on prices (except for the 
interchange  fees)  and  quantities  that  is  commonly  used  to  estimate  discrete  choice  models. 
Instead, we have data on locations and entry decisions and different policy regimes.
11 Since it is 
not immediately apparent how these data identify the parameters, we discuss this issue.  
  Recall that we estimate all of our parameters except for the coefficient on price using the 
Iowa data. Thus, it is necessary that the Iowa data identify the consumer disutility of distance 
α  and mean utility δ, and the means γj and standard deviation σe of the fixed costs of entry. 
These parameters will be identified from variations across markets in the number of potential 
entrants, the number of consumers, and the relative distances between these sets. 
  In  particular,  the  model  is  semiparametrically  identified:  with  enough  data,  we  can 
recover  the  parameters  and  the  underlying  distribution  of  the  fixed  costs  of  entry  without 
imposing a parametric functional form on the fixed costs of entry. To see this, fix δ, and consider 
a sequence of markets (e.g. separate counties) which all have exactly one potential entrant, but 
vary continuously in the number of consumers.
12 For now, assume also that all consumers are 
located at the same place as the firm, so that distance is irrelevant. Given δ, we can evaluate the 
                                                 
11 Recent work by Thomadsen (2005) estimates discrete choice models with price data but without quantity data. 
While we do not have price data, the crucial information that we do have that discrete choice analyses typically do 
not have is the set of potential locations that chose not to set up ATMs.   21 
marginal profits for any potential entrant as a function of the number of consumers (since the 
revenue per customer is p
interchange , which is known). By tabulating the fraction of actual entrants 
for any number of consumers, we can recover the distribution of fixed costs. As an example, 
suppose that when there are 545 consumers, marginal profits are 1.4, and the single potential 
entrant enters 73 percent of the time. For the given δ, this implies that the distribution of fixed 
costs, which we will call G, satisfies 
 
G
!1 .73 ( ) =1.4 . With enough variation across the number of 
consumers, we can recover the entire distribution of fixed costs. 
  Different values of δ will imply different substitution patterns from the outside good to an 
ATM as the number of firms increases. With a high δ, total transactions will remain roughly 
constant; with a lower δ, total transactions will increase, as more people substitute from the 
outside good. Intuitively then, δ will be identified from the differences in entry patterns across 
the number of firms. The Appendix formally proves that with infinite data, the only value of δ 
that will yield the same G distribution across 1 or 2 potential entrants is the true δ. Hence, the 
model is identified using data with different numbers of potential entrants, as there is only one 
possible candidate for the estimate of δ, namely the one that yields the same G distribution 
across potential entrants.  
  Since we have non-parametrically recovered the whole distribution of fixed costs, the 
parameters on mean fixed costs γ will be identified from the mean of the distributions of fixed 
costs for banks and grocery stores. With sufficient data, we can identify any distribution for e 
with mean zero.  
                                                                                                                                                            
12 In the  actual data,  the number of consumers  can only vary discretely.  But since  the variation in distance  is   22 
  The disutility of distance parameter α can be identified from variation in the distances 
between consumers and potential entrants across markets. For example, with a very negative α, 
there will be much less entry if otherwise identical consumers and firms are far away from each 
other. With α close to zero, this variation in the data will have little effect. 
  Last, the consumer parameter on disutility of price will be identified from the different 
pattern of entry in Minnesota from Iowa. For example, if demand is very elastic, then firms will 
be unable to obtain high surcharges from consumers in Minnesota, and hence the number of 
ATMs per capita should be similar in the two regions. If demand is inelastic, however, we should 
see more ATMs in Minnesota. In addition, if demand is inelastic, the pattern of entry will be 
different in Minnesota, with less clustering in the town centers as margins from entry will fall 
with more firms. 
  While the above arguments show that we can obtain identification with data from an 
infinite  number  of  markets,  as  a  practical  matter,  we  only  have  data  from  the  Iowa  and 
Minnesota border counties. Thus, it is of interest to understand how much our actual data can 
identify. In section 4.1 we perform Monte Carlo experiments that show the precision of estimates 
given our exogenous data on firm and consumer locations.   
 
                                                                                                                                                            
continuous, this is not a limitation.   23 
3. Data 
 
3.1 The ATM industry 
  The ATM industry infrastructure consists of card issuing banks, ATM machines, and a 
telecommunications network to process transactions.
13 In the early stages of ATM deployment, 
ATM machines were generally owned and operated by banks, with the machines physically 
located on the bank premises. By the 1990s, much of the growth in ATM deployment shifted to 
nonbank  locations,  such  as  convenience  stores  and  grocery  stores.
14  Today,  the  majority  of 
ATMs are located at sites other than banks. More than 75 percent of all ATM transactions are 
cash withdrawals, with the remainder being deposits and balance inquiries. 
  ATM cardholding customers, ATMs, and card issuing banks are all linked together by 
shared networks. In 2002, there were about 40 networks, the largest being the national networks 
of Cirrus and Plus, which  are owned by MasterCard and Visa, respectively.
15 A transaction 
involving a customer from Bank A using an ATM owned by Institution B generates a number of 
fees. Bank A must pay the network a switch fee for routing the transaction. These fees range 
from 3 to 8 cents per transaction.
16 Second, Bank A, the card issuing bank, must pay the ATM 
owner, Institution B, an interchange fee. These fees range from 30 to 40 cents for a withdrawal 
and are determined by the ATM network. In the case where an ATM and a customer’s bank both 
use multiple networks, the actual interchange fee will vary based upon the agreements between 
the ATM and the different networks. Bank A may also charge its cardholding customer a foreign 
                                                 
13 Hayashi, Sullivan, and Weiner (2003) provide a detailed background on the industry. 
14 According to a recent survey by Dove Consulting (2004), the most attractive sites for new entry are convenience 
stores, shopping malls, supermarkets, airports, and schools. 
15 See Hayashi, Sullivan, and Weiner (2003). 
16 See Hayashi, Sullivan, and Weiner (2003).   24 
fee for using Institution B’s machine; we do not model this fee. Institution B may charge the 
customer  a  surcharge  fee  for  using  its  ATM  machine.  As  of  2002,  87  percent  of  all  ATM 
deployers levied surcharges on foreign-acquired customers. The average surcharge across all 
operators  was  about  $1.50.  However,  fees  are  typically  only  paid  by  about  one-third  of 
customers,
17 suggesting a mean actual fee of 50 cents. 
  According  to  a  recent  consulting  study,  the  average  ATM  cost  $1,314  per  month  to 
operate  in  2003,  with  the  costs  consisting  mostly  of  fixed  items  such  as  depreciation, 
maintenance, telecommunications, and cash replenishment.
18 Revenue comes from the assorted 
fees generated by an ATM transaction. 
 
3.2 Sample and data  
  Our  first  data  choice  is  in  defining  the  sample.  As  our  model  is  identified  by  the 
difference in the pattern of ATM diffusion for Iowa and Minnesota, we want the Iowa and 
Minnesota  counties  in  our  sample  to  have  similar  consumer  preferences  and  firm  costs.  To 
ensure that we have similar counties, we keep the border counties from each state as well as 
counties that are within one county of the border. Eight of the counties in the eastern part of 
Minnesota  have  more  population  density  than  the  corresponding  Iowa  counties  and  include 
medium-sized  cities  such  as  Rochester.  We  believe  that  the  dense  counties  are  sufficiently 
different from the corresponding Iowa counties, and so we  exclude these counties from our 
sample. Figure 1 displays a map of the counties in our sample, and their population densities.  
                                                 
17 See Dove Consulting (2002). 
18 See Dove Consulting (2004).   25 
  We create three principal sources of data for the counties in our sample: potential ATM 
locations, actual ATM locations, and consumer locations. Our data come from the year 2002, 
prior to the lifting of the surcharge ban in Iowa. We discuss each of these data sources in turn. 
  Our first data set provides the set of potential ATM locations. ATMs are almost certain to 
be inside other retail establishments, particularly in the rural counties from our  sample. We 
obtained  phone  numbers  of  all  the  retail  establishments  for  one  county  in  Iowa  (Mitchell 
County),  using  the  web  site  switchboard.com.  By  calling  every  retail  establishment  in  that 
county,  we  found  that  the  ATMs  were  all  located  in  grocery  stores  (including  convenience 
stores) or banks. Based on this initial query, we chose grocery stores and banks as the set of 
potential ATMs. We obtained the addresses and phone numbers of grocery stores and banks for 
our  counties  from  a  private  company  called  InfoUSA,  which  markets  this  information  for 
commercial use. We then geocoded these addresses to obtain detailed latitude and longitude 
information. 
  Our second data source is information on the locations of ATMs. We obtained location 
data from several large ATM networks with substantial operations in Minnesota and Iowa. The 
networks in our data set include Visa Plus, a network that is national in scope, and SHAZAM, 
which is based in Iowa and has ATMs throughout the central states.
19 The data provide the 
addresses of ATMs for all machines in the databases of the networks. In the case of Visa Plus, 
the database is used for their web-based ATM finder. 
  There are two potential problems with these data: missing ATMs and missing potential 
ATMs. We found that the ATM locator databases were incomplete, resulting in many missing 
ATMs. To address this problem, we called every InfoUSA potential entrant (i.e., grocery stores, 
                                                 
19 We thank these networks for providing us with data.   26 
and banks) and asked if there was an ATM on the premises. For Iowa, this process resulted in the 
identification of an additional 93 entrants from the telephone interviews (24 percent of the total 
number of entrants). For Minnesota, we identified an additional 105 entrants from the telephone 
interviews (52 percent of the total). 
  The InfoUSA data of potential ATMs was more complete, though still not perfect. About 
25 percent of the entrants from the ATM locator databases were not in the InfoUSA database. 
These missing ATMs were distributed fairly evenly, accounting for about 10 percent of our total 
sample  in  each  state.  Of  the  missing  98  ATMs,  38  were  located  in  grocery  stores  and 
convenience stores and 26 were located in banks that were simply not in the InfoUSA list. The 
others were in specialized categories, such as colleges, hospitals, and movie theaters. 
  Our third data set provides the locations for consumers. These data are from the 1990 
Census, and provide the location of consumer residences at the census block level. This level is 
not quite as fine as the address level, but still very small. It would be possible to supplement 
these data with data on employment locations, treating these as additional people, although this 
would likely have little effect, because of the similarity of residential and employment locations 
in our sample of rural counties. 
  For some of our estimates, we allow the entire border region to have the same mean fixed 
costs for ATMs. For other estimates, we allow the mean fixed costs to vary across counties. For 
these estimates, we group the mean fixed costs so that the Iowa border county, its southern 
neighbor (e.g., Lyon and Sioux, respectively) and its Minnesota neighbors (Pipestone and Rock, 
in this case) all share the same fixed costs. Note that firms compete exclusively within a county 
in our base specifications and with everyone in the whole border region of their state for other 
specifications.    27 
  In  the  estimation  we  assume  that  the  interchange  fee,  p
interchange ,  is  35  cents,  an 
approximation to true values noted above. The value of  p
interchange  will not affect the coefficient 
estimates in the Iowa analysis, as expected profits in (5) are proportional to p
interchange . However, 
the  chosen  value  will  affect  coefficient  estimates  in  Minnesota  because,  with  surcharging, 
expected profits are now proportional to the sum of the interchange fee and the entering firm’s 
price.  
 
3.3 Reduced-form evidence 
  Table 1 provides some summary statistics of the data. We have 32 counties in our data, of 
which 21 are in Iowa. Our counties are sparsely populated, with an average of about 16,000 
people per county in Iowa, and somewhat fewer in Minnesota. In spite of the relatively small 
populations  in  this  region  of  the  country,  each  county  contains  about  1,000  census  blocks, 
suggesting that the unit of geographic measurement for people is small. There are, on average, 
about 15 percent fewer potential ATM locations in Minnesota than in Iowa. The number of 
actual and potential ATMs varies a lot across counties, from a low of 10 to a high of 87.  
  In Iowa, there are an average of 18.8 ATMs per county and 1.13 ATMs per 1000 people 
per county. The corresponding statistics for Minnesota are 18.3 and 1.23, suggesting that the 
unregulated price may result in more entry. We can sharpen this intuition with a county-level 
regression of ATMs per person on a state dummy variable, including controls for the number of 
consumers and potential entry locations, shown in Table 2. 
  Table 2 reports that Iowa counties have about 20 percent fewer ATMs than Minnesota 
counties  with  similar  characteristics,  compared  to  the  8  percent  difference  in  the  raw  data 
reported in Table 1. The greater difference compared to Table 1 is explained by the fact that the   28 
Iowa counties have more potential ATM locations, which appears to cause more entry. Both 
Tables 1 and 2 show that most of the difference between ATM deployment in Minnesota and 
Iowa is attributable to additional deployment at grocery stores and not at banks. This is probably 
because banks are installing ATMs at their branches for reasons other than generating transaction 
fees, such as diverting customers away from more costly transactions with a bank teller. 
  In addition to predicting more entry in Minnesota, our model also predicts a different 
pattern of entry. In particular, entrants in Minnesota should be more likely to stay away from 
other potential entrants, in order to exercise more local monopoly power. The last row of Table 2 
examines whether this prediction is substantiated in the data. We find that ATMs in Iowa are 
more likely to be near other potential ATMs, as predicted in the data.  
  Figure  2  shows  the  potential  and  actual  ATM  locations  and  population  for  two 
neighboring counties, Osceola County, Iowa, and Nobles County, Minnesota. These two counties 
contain a mix of both small towns (e.g., Worthington, MN, and Sibley, IA) and rural areas. One 
can see that entry is more likely in the urban areas than in outlying areas. In addition, consistent 
with Table 2, there is more entry in rural areas in Minnesota than in Iowa. Last, note that there 
are some potential ATMs near the county borders, for instance in Brewster, MN, suggesting that 
it might be important to allow competition to extend beyond the county border. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Monte Carlo evidence 
  Before  examining  parameter  estimates  from  actual  data,  we  provide  Monte  Carlo 
evidence on the performance of our estimator. We construct simulated data by choosing “true”   29 
parameters and exogenous data, computing equilibrium entry probabilities conditional on these 
values, and then simulating entry decisions from the equilibrium entry probabilities. As with the 
real data, we construct “Iowa” data where prices are regulated to be zero, and “Minnesota” data 
where prices can vary. We repeat the simulation 10 times to create 10 independent data sets, and 
then examine the performance of different estimators across the 10 data sets. 
  The Monte Carlo evidence is presented in Table 3. Column 1 provides the parameter 
values that we used to simulate the data. We chose the parameters to be round numbers that are 
close to both our initial priors and the estimated parameters. 
  Columns 2–4 describe three different sets of parameter estimates, all based on the same 
simulated data sets. The data sets for these columns have 500 distinct markets, with 10 or fewer 
firms and 50 or fewer consumer locations per market. These sizes are chosen to ensure that the 
maximum likelihood estimator is computationally feasible, which is not true for the real data. 
Column 2 describes the maximum likelihood estimates computed using (7), column 3 describes 
the pseudo–likelihood estimates where the sums are completely evaluated instead of simulated, 
and column 4 describes the simulated pseudo–likelihood estimates; these use the same estimator 
that we use to estimate the model with the real data. Each entry in the table lists the mean and 
standard deviation of the estimated parameters across the 10 data sets (and not the standard 
errors of the estimates). 
  As with the real data, we estimate every parameter but the price coefficient β using the 
“Iowa” data. We can then potentially use these estimated parameters and the “Minnesota” data to 
estimate  the  price  coefficient.  We  did  not  include  these  results  because  of  the  prohibitive 
computational  cost  of  performing  the  40  maximum  likelihood  estimation  runs  (10  each  for 
columns 2–5) necessary to generate this Monte Carlo evidence. However, we did perform the   30 
“Minnesota” estimation for a more limited number of runs. While we do not report these results, 
the findings are consistent with the Monte Carlo evidence that we report. 
  We find that all three estimators perform similarly and well. For instance, the true value 
of α, the disutility of distance, is –.25, and the mean estimated values for the three methods are 
all  within  .005  of  the  true  value,  with  standard  deviations  of  less  than  .07.  Moreover,  the 
differences between the true parameters and the mean estimated parameters are likely due to the 
fact that we have only simulated 10 data sets (for computational reasons). Thus, columns 2–4 
demonstrate that our model is well–identified given the simulated data, and that the pseudo-
likelihood method appears to yield little loss in efficiency relative to the method of maximum 
likelihood. 
  A remaining question is the extent to which our actual data contain enough variation to 
identify the parameters well. Column 5 of Table 3 describes the estimated parameters for data 
sets where the exogenous data are the real data and the endogenous data are computed using the 
equilibrium and the values of the true parameters reported in column 1. Again, the pseudo–
likelihood estimator performs well. This suggests that our real exogenous data contain enough 
variation to identify the parameters, provided that the endogenous data are generated by the 
model. 
  Also  of  interest  is  the  performance  of  our  reduced–form  predictors  of  the  entry 
probabilities,  which  are  used  in  the  pseudo–likelihood  estimation.  Since  we  know  the  true 
probabilities of entry for the simulated data from the equilibrium computation, we can compare 
the true probabilities to the predicted probabilities. The bottom row of Table 3 lists the mean root 
mean squared differences in the probabilities for the Iowa and Minnesota estimation for the two 
data  sets.  We  find  a  fairly  close  match  between  the  two,  with  mean  root  mean  squared   31 
differences of about .06 for the first data set and somewhat larger values of .125 to .192 for the 
second data set, probably because of the smaller sizes in this case. This further suggests that our 
reduced–form approximations of the true entry probabilities are reasonable. 
 
4.2 Parameter estimates 
  We turn now to our base parameter estimates for the real data, which are given in Table 
4. The specifications for this table assume that customers and ATMs only compete with other 
customers and banks within the same county. There are two sets of specifications: in column 1 
the mean fixed cost is assumed to be the same across counties, while column 2 allows fixed costs 
to vary by county, as discussed in Section 3. For each specification, the first several rows provide 
the parameters that are estimated from Iowa data, while the price coefficients at the bottom are 
estimated from the Minnesota data. 
  The model with different fixed costs across counties fits the Iowa data better, in the sense 
that a likelihood ratio test could reject the fact that the fixed costs are the same across counties 
(!
2 10 ( ) = 21.6 , p=.02). For the Minnesota data, it is not possible to conduct a likelihood ratio 
test, since the parameter values for the other parameters are not the same. Nonetheless, column 1 
has a lower likelihood, suggesting that the fixed costs from neighboring Iowa counties are not 
fitting the Minnesota data as well as the mean fixed costs across counties. 
  Most of the estimates in this table are precisely estimated and appear to be reasonable. 
The coefficient of distance on utility is –.178 in column 1 and –.151 in column 2. The coefficient 
in column 2, but not column 1, is significantly different from zero at traditional significance 
levels. This implies that a person who had a 50 percent chance of using a particular ATM would 
use it with roughly 46 percent probability if the ATM were to move 1 kilometer further away.   32 
This coefficient appears to be a reasonable tradeoff of distance for a sample that consists of rural 
Iowa and Minnesota. 
  The coefficient on price is estimated to be –1.48 in column 1 and –2.18 in column 2. This 
implies that a consumer values one kilometer of distance as 8 cents to 10 cents depending on the 
specification, figures that also appear to be reasonable. The estimates also imply that a person 
who had a 50 percent chance of using a particular ATM would use it with 46 percent probability 
(column 1) or 45 percent (column 2) if price were to increase by 10 cents. This suggests that 
consumers are quite price elastic. The underlying reason why our estimates of the price elasticity 
are high is because, in the data, ATM entry per capita is only slightly higher in Minnesota than in 
Iowa. This suggests that firms are not able to make much more money in Minnesota, which in 
turn implies that demand is elastic. 
  From column 1, the mean fixed costs of operating an ATM at a nonbank location is 
estimated to be $93 with a standard deviation of $263. For column 2, the mean fixed costs are 
estimated to vary between $19 and $409, with a standard deviation of $153.  
  The mean fixed costs of operating an ATM at a bank is estimated to be almost exactly the 
same. We initially found it surprising that banks would not have a lower fixed cost of entry than 
grocers. However, the raw data show a very similar entry probability for banks and grocers (58 
percent vs. 62 percent), which explains this finding.  
  As our consumer model is a discrete choice, the time period in our model of roughly one 
week  is  the  interval  over  which  consumers  might  decide  whether  or  not  to  make  a  cash 
withdrawal. Our estimates of fixed costs for actual entrants are smaller but reasonably close to 
the (imputed) weekly fixed costs of about $300 noted in Section 3. The smaller estimates are 
likely due to grocery stores and banks opening ATMs because of complementarities.   33 
  Table  5  provides  a  set  of  alternate  specifications  as  a  robustness  check.  The  first 
specification allows for competition across the entire border region within a state. We report a 
specification that imposes the same mean fixed costs across counties, though we found similar 
results when the fixed costs are allowed to vary across counties. The parameter estimates are 
very  similar  to  those  from  Table  4  Model  1.  In  particular,  the  coefficients  on  distance  are 
estimated to be slightly larger in magnitude (–.275 instead of –.178). The coefficients on price 
are similar, as are the coefficients on fixed costs. 
  One potential issue with our model is that we have simplified the profit function for 
potential ATMs to ignore the complementarity with their other business. This is potentially more 
problematic  for  banks,  who  may  install  ATMs  mostly  as  a  convenience  to  their  banking 
customers, rather than to earn the ATM fees. The second specification provides a model where 
we  model  the  entry  decisions  for  non-banks  (principally  grocery  stores)  only.  In  this 
specification, we assume that entry decisions for banks are exogenously made, and fixed at their 
actual value. This specification yields similar results to the base specification, suggesting that 
grocery stores and banks are choosing to open ATMs based on roughly the same criteria. One 
issue is that our coefficients mostly lose their significance, likely because the sample size is 
effectively smaller, since it now includes only the non-banks as potential entrants. 
  Table 6 provides predictions of the estimated model, including the equilibrium prices and 
quantities for ATMs, which are useful for understanding the fit of our model. We predict that the 
average surcharge is 38 cents when surcharges are allowed. This is about one-third the mean 
posted surcharge. However, since only one-third of customers actually pay the surcharge, it is as 
close as the model can come to reflecting reality, given that we do not allow firms to charge   34 
surcharges selectively in our model.
20 The average number of ATM transactions is about 555 for 
every 1,000 people per week when surcharges are banned, with about a 20 percent decrease to 
469 transactions when surcharges are allowed. Dividing these figures by the number of ATMs 
per 1,000 people, we find that each ATM is performing about 500 transactions per week when 
surcharges are allowed and 400 when they are not, numbers that are very consistent with industry 
data.
21 These figures suggest that our model is able to replicate key equilibrium predictions of the 
model reasonably well, in spite of the fact that the parameters are estimated using only entry 
data. 
 
4.3 Counterfactual policy experiments 
  Table 6 uses the parameter estimates to evaluate the impact of counterfactual surcharge 
policies on consumer and firm welfare and the prevalence and price of ATMs. We do this by 
postulating counterfactual policy regimes and simulating the equilibrium entry decisions given 
these policy regimes. We examine both bans and taxes on surcharges. For any vector of firm 
entry  decisions,  we  can  evaluate  the  expected  consumer  welfare  and  firm  profits  using  the 
standard  multinomial  logit  formulas.  The  consumer  welfare  measures  are  in  units  of  utility. 
However, we can convert them to dollars by dividing them by the estimated marginal utility of 
money, which is  !". This then allows us to add consumer and producer surplus to form a 
measure of total surplus. 
                                                 
20 As a robustness check, we estimate a specification where two-thirds of consumers do not pay the surcharge and 
one-third do pay the surcharge. This specification results in an estimated average price of $2.80, somewhat higher 
than the mean posted surcharge. 
21 Dove Consulting (2002) reports an average of 4,479 transactions per month per on-premise machine and 1,560 per 
month per off-premise machine.   35 
  We can also compute the policy that maximizes total surplus, as would be chosen by a 
social planner with this goal. We assume that the planner provides a mandatory entry and pricing 
strategy  to  each  firm  as  a  function  of  that  firm’s  cost  draw,  but  does  not  coordinate  entry 
decisions across firms. As the marginal cost of an ATM transaction is zero, the planner will 
always pick prices of zero, leaving only the entry decision to be computed. 
  Table  6  provides  the results  of  these  counterfactual  experiments,  evaluated  using  the 
parameters of Table 4, Model 1. We chose to use a specification where the mean fixed costs are 
the same across counties because of its fit to the Minnesota data.  
  Under both the surcharge and no surcharge regimes, the average total surplus per 1,000 
people is about $885, with a standard deviation of about $230. Even though there is almost no 
difference in the mean total welfare levels between the two regimes, allowing for surcharges has 
large distributional consequences. A ban on surcharges increases consumer surplus by about 33 
percent (from $333 to $446 per 1,000 people) and reduces producer surplus by about 20 percent. 
Not surprisingly, allowing for surcharges results in more ATMs (an average of 1.27 instead of 
1.12 per 1,000 people) but fewer total transactions due to the higher prices. The implication is 
that consumers gain more from the lower prices without surcharges than they do from the lower 
travel time when surcharges are allowed. However, firms are not able to capture as much of the 
surplus with just the fixed interchange fee, and hence, they lose out. 
  We also considered a regime where surcharges are allowed, but where firms must pay a 
20 percent tax on the surcharges that is remitted to consumers on a lump–sum basis. This regime 
results in outcomes that are between the two boundary cases. Consumer and producer surpluses 
are both in between the two extreme policies. In addition, the mean surcharge with the tax is 
about 20 percent lower than if the surcharges are unregulated.   36 
  All three regimes result in a welfare level that is about 14 percent lower than the planner 
welfare level. The planner chooses about 50 percent more ATMs than even under the surcharge 
regime. The fact that there is more entry implies that firms are adding to consumer surplus with 
their entry more than they are reducing profits to other firms by stealing their business. Because 
of the additional entry and the zero prices, the volume of transactions is higher than under the 
other regimes. 
  One of the surprising results from the policy experiments is the finding that surcharge 
bans depress ATM entry by just 12 percent. This relatively small effect stands in stark contrast to 
the observation that ATM deployment tripled between 1996 (when the networks lifted their 
surcharge ban) and 2001 but is completely consistent with the difference between Iowa and 
Minnesota border data. It is worth noting that ATM deployment was growing rapidly throughout 
the 1980s and early 1990s as well, apparently for reasons other than the price of ATM services. 
For this reason, we believe that our border study affords the cleanest way of identifying the 
relationship between surcharges and entry. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
  We have developed a structural model of ATM utility, costs, and entry. Our specification 
of utility includes travel distance and price. We assume that potential entrant firms enter based 
on the total revenues from entering minus the fixed costs; we assume that marginal costs are 
zero. We also assume that a firm’s fixed cost is private information that is not revealed to other 
firms in the industry. Firms’ entry decisions are based on the Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of their 
entry game.   37 
  We develop a quasi–likelihood method to estimate the parameters of this model using 
data on the locations of consumers, potential ATMs, and actual ATMs. Our method of inference 
obtains estimates of our game–theoretic model of entry without solving for the equilibrium of the 
game, and hence is computationally feasible. Our estimation procedure is identified by the fact 
that the state of Iowa fixed the surcharge price of ATMs at zero during our sample period. This 
allows us to estimate most of the parameters from Iowa data, without worrying about the price 
elasticity. We then make the assumption that consumer preferences and costs for counties in 
Minnesota and Iowa near their border are similar. By substituting the parameters estimated using 
Iowa data, we then recover the price elasticity using the Minnesota data. 
  We provide Monte Carlo evidence on our estimation procedure, and find that the quasi–
likelihood method yields similar results to the method of maximum likelihood and can provide 
reasonably  precise  estimates  given  the  scope  of  our  data.  Turning  to  the  results,  we  find  a 
coefficient on distance that is significantly negative and moderate in size. The consumer tradeoff 
between price and distance also fits our expectations. We use these estimates to find the welfare 
and  entry  consequences  of  an  ATM  surcharge  ban.  We  find  that  a  surcharge  ban  would 
moderately decrease the number of ATMs, increase consumer surplus, decrease firm profits, and 
result  in  roughly  the  same  total  surplus.  Mean  total  welfare  levels  are  quite  similar  across 
regimes that allow surcharges and regimes that ban them. However, the choice of surcharge 
regime has large distributional consequences. A surcharge ban raises consumer welfare by about 
10 percent, while lowering producer welfare by a similar amount. Policies that allow surcharges 
and policies that totally ban them, result in welfare levels that are about 14 percent below the 
first–best welfare levels.   38 
  We believe that our study results in three principal outputs. First, it provides evidence on 
the impact of ATM surcharges on outcomes and surplus levels in the market for ATMs. More 
generally, this provides evidence on the nature of excess entry in other differentiated products 
oligopoly markets. Since our study is cross sectional in nature, our methods are less susceptible 
to the problem of confounding entry due to the lifting of the surcharge ban with entry due to 
whatever exogenous factors have caused ATM deployment to flourish since the early 1980s. 
Second, it shows that data on firm entry combined with quasi–experimental variation in policies 
can be used to estimate the demand and cost parameters of this industry. Third, the study shows 
that our quasi–likelihood method can be used to feasibly estimate the parameters of structural 
game theoretic models without solving for the equilibria of the games. 
 
Appendix 
 
As discussed in Section 2.3, with infinite data we can uniquely recover the distribution of fixed 
costs for any number of potential entrants n, conditional on δ. Call the recovered distribution 
 
G n,! and let  !0  denote the true δ. 
Proposition: 
Assume that there are infinite data for 1 and 2 potential entrants and for each value of the number 
of consumers. Then, 
 
G1,! = G 2,! " ! = !0. 
Proof: 
Note  that 
 
G1,!0 = G 2,!0 ,  since  these  distributions  are  the  same  in  the  model,  and  the  data  is 
generated by the model at the true parameters. Now consider any   ! " > "0. We will show that   39 
 
G1, ! " # G 2, ! "   (an  analogous  argument  follows  for    ! " < "0).  Assume  by  contradiction  that 
 
G1, ! " = G 2, ! " . Let  pn denote the entry probability with a consumers and n firms, and let 
 
!",n,a  
denote the marginal profits (not inclusive of fixed costs) for a potential entrant contemplating 
entry with n potential entrants, a consumers and consumer mean utility of δ where the calculation 
is made assuming that the potential entrant calculates its marginal profits using the probability of 
entry from the data for its rival.  
 
With 2 potential entrants, marginal profits when the number of consumers is a will be less than 
with 1 potential entrant. Thus, 
 
!"0 ,2,a = b!"0 ,1,a  for some  b <1. Because of the structure of the 
consumer problem, marginal profit with  b! a  consumers satisfies 
 
!"0 ,2,ba = b!"0 ,1,a  and hence 
 
!"0 ,2,a = !"0 ,2,ba . This implies that  G1,!0 "!0 ,1,ba ( ) = G2,!0 "!0 ,2,a ( ) = p2 . Note also that there is an 
equality across values of δ and hence G1,!0 "!0 ,1,ba ( ) = G1, # ! " # ! ,1,ba ( ) = p2 .  
 
Now importantly, because of the assumption of Type I extreme value consumer unobservables, 
with  ! " , more consumers will substitute from the inside good to the new firm than with  !0 , and 
hence 
 
! " # ,2,a = c! " # ,1,a   for  some   c < b.  Then,  by  the  same  logic  as  above 
G1, ! " # ! " ,1,ca ( ) = G2, ! " # ! " ,2,a ( ) = p2,  implying  that  G1, ! " # ! " ,1,ba ( ) = G2, ! " # ! " ,2,a ( ) > p2  and  yielding  a 
contradiction. Thus, it must have been the case that the two distributions G1, ! "  and G2, ! "  were not 
identical. Last, note that although we have assumed that consumer unobservables follow a Type I 
extreme value distribution, the proof would work with any distribution that results in substitution 
away from the outside good as the number of firms increases.   40 
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Table 1: 
Summary statistics of the data by county and state 
 
 
Statistic  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  N 
Potential ATM 
locations  32.6  16.5  14  87  21 
ATMs  18.8  10.9  5  48  21 
ATMs per  
1000 consumers  1.13  .347  .458  2.08  21 
ATMs not at banks 
per 1000 consumers  .688  .263  .092  1.27  21 
Consumers  16,384  8,720  7,267  46,733  21 
I
o
w
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
i
e
s
 
Census blocks with 
consumers  988.1  315.8  563  1,727  21 
Potential ATM 
locations  27.7  8.16  17  42  11 
ATMs  18.3  5.90  10  30  11 
ATMs per  
1000 consumers  1.23  .188  .960  1.48  11 
ATMs not at banks 
per 1000 consumers  .789  .159  .498  1.01  11 
Consumers  15,021  4,910  9,660  22,914  11 
M
i
n
n
e
s
o
t
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
i
e
s
 
Census blocks with 
consumers  944.7  271.3  582  1,407  11 
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Table 2:  
Reduced–form determinants of ATM entry 
 
  OLS regressions at county level 
  Regressors     
  Iowa 
Consu-
mers 
(1000s) 
Potential 
entry 
locations 
Potential 
grocer 
entry 
locations 
Potential 
bank entry 
locations 
Adjusted 
R
2  Obs. 
ATMs per 
1000 
consumer 
–.256*** 
(.073) 
–.111*** 
(.016) 
.063*** 
(.008)      .62  32 
Bank 
ATMs per 
1000 cons. 
–.057 
(.044) 
–.043*** 
(.010) 
.013 
(.009)   
.031** 
(.014)  .49  32 
Grocer 
ATMs per 
1000 cons. 
–.207*** 
(.073) 
–.073*** 
(.017) 
.009 
(.015) 
.050** 
(.024)    .37  32 
  Logit estimation at potential ATM level 
  Regressors     
  Iowa  Nearby 
pot. ATMs 
Nearby 
consumers 
(1000s) 
Nearby 
pot. ATMs 
!  Iowa 
Nearby 
cons. !  
Iowa 
Log 
likelihood  Obs. 
Entry  –.107 
(.250) 
–.102 
(.094) 
4.54** 
(2.00) 
.242** 
(.110) 
–5.97*** 
(2.28)  –655.2  989 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. “Nearby” refers to 
within .2 kilometers. 
 
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
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Table 3: 
Monte Carlo evidence from simulated equilibrium data 
 
Method 
True 
parameters 
used to 
simulate data 
Estimated 
ML 
parameters 
Estimated 
pseudo–ML 
params., no 
simulation 
Estimated 
pseudo–ML 
parameters, 
simulation 
Estimated 
pseudo–ML 
parameters 
Std. dev. of 
unobserved 
profits (!e)  
1.5  1.59 
(.321) 
1.51 
(.331) 
1.51 
(.319) 
1.21 
(.518) 
Utility from 
distance (α) 
(Units: KM) 
–.25  –.254 
(.069) 
–.255 
(.067) 
–.253 
(.066) 
–.250 
(.133) 
Consumer 
benefit (δ)  –1  –.831 
(.570) 
–.931 
(.580) 
–.942 
(.562) 
–1.94 
(.990) 
Extra fixed 
cost at bank 
( ! " atbank j) 
–.5  –.641 
(.210) 
–.620 
(.217) 
–.616 
(.209) 
–.286 
(.222) 
P
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
 
Mean fixed 
cost (! county j) 
(Units: $100) 
1  1.15 
(.289) 
1.10 
(.299) 
1.09 
(.295) 
.685 
(.676) 
Source of 
exogenous data    Simulated exogenous data with  
maximum 10 potential entrants 
Real 
exogenous 
data 
Root mean 
squared 
difference, true 
and predicted 
entry probs. 
 
“Iowa” data: 
.059 (.004) 
 
“Minnesota” data: 
.055 (.006) 
 
Iowa data: 
.125 (.011) 
 
Minn. data: 
.192 (.014) 
 
 
Note: Standard deviations of estimated parameters across 10 simulated estimates are in 
parentheses.   46 
Table 4: 
Base results 
 
Parameter  Fixed costs the same 
across counties 
Fixed cost variation 
across counties 
Std. dev. of unobserved profits 
(!e) (Units: $100) 
2.63*** 
(.763) 
1.53*** 
(.305) 
Utility from distance (α) 
(Units: kilometers) 
–.178 
(.156) 
–.151** 
(.070) 
Consumer benefit (δ)  –.696 
(1.22) 
–.101 
(.854) 
Extra fixed cost at bank 
( ! " atbank j)\(Units: $100) 
–.003 
(.425) 
.057 
(.257) 
Mean FC (! county j) Allamakee  1.47** (.741) 
Mean FC (! county j) Worth  2.67*** (.393) 
Mean FC (! county j) Howard  1.04 (.777) 
Mean FC (! county j) Dickinson  .194 (.539) 
Mean FC (! county j) Emmet  1.34** (.549) 
Mean FC (! county j) Winneshiek  1.47** (.618) 
Mean FC (! county j) Mitchell  4.09*** (.904) 
Mean FC (! county j) Winnebago  1.86*** (.657) 
Mean FC (! county j) Kossuth  1.97*** (.683) 
Mean FC () Lyon  1.32** (.550) 
Mean FC (! county j) O’Brien 
.933 
(.680) 
1.38** (.612) 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
I
o
w
a
 
d
a
t
a
 
Log likelihood  –459.0  –437.4 
Utility from price (β)  –1.48*** (.228)  –2.18*** (.182) 
M
i
n
n
e
s
o
t
a
 
d
a
t
a
 
Log likelihood  –192.54  –222.3 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level   47 
Table 5: 
Robustness results 
 
Parameter  Competition 
throughout state 
Entry model for non-
banks only 
Std. dev. of unobserved profits 
(!e) (Units: $100) 
3.00*** 
(1.01) 
3.25** 
(1.99) 
Utility from distance (α) 
(Units: kilometers) 
–.275 
(.316) 
–.120 
(.198) 
Consumer benefit (δ)  –.910 
(1.51) 
–1.56 
(1.97) 
Extra fixed cost at bank 
( ! " atbank j)\(Units: $100) 
.005 
(.483)   
Mean FC (! county j)   .491 
(.946) 
.478 
(.358) 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
I
o
w
a
 
d
a
t
a
 
Log likelihood  –460.7  –281.8 
M
i
n
n
e
s
o
t
a
 
d
a
t
a
 
Utility from price (β)  -1.10*** 
(.195)   
 
Log likelihood  –191.9   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level   48 
Table 6: 
Predictions of the estimated model 
 
 
 
Policy: 
Ban on ATM 
surcharges 
Policy: 
ATM 
surcharges 
allowed 
Policy: 
20% tax on 
ATM 
surcharges 
First-best 
entry and 
pricing rule 
Consumer surplus 
per 1,000 people  
$446 
($191) 
$333 
($170) 
$380 
($180)  n/a 
Producer surplus per 
1,000 people 
$441 
($53) 
$551 
($76) 
$508 
($66)  n/a 
Total surplus per 
1,000 people 
$887 
($228) 
$884 
($234) 
$888 
($232) 
$1022 
($239) 
Number of ATMs 
per 1,000 people 
1.12 
(.139) 
1.27 
(1.63) 
1.21 
(.150) 
1.96 
(.261) 
Average surcharge  0  $.38 
($.01) 
$.30 
($.01)  0 
Volume of 
transactions per 
1,000 people 
555 
(104) 
469 
(114) 
485 
(113) 
675 
(83.8) 
Number of people  15,915 
(7,567) 
Number of potential 
entrants 
30.91 
(14.26) 
M
e
a
n
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
c
o
u
n
t
i
e
s
 
o
f
:
 
N  32 
 
Note: We compute equilibria using the parameters from Table 4, Model 1. The reported values 
are the means across counties of the expected values within each county. Standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses. ￿
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